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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC 7102-80

27 October 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

Richard Lehman
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE
(Meeting held on 21 October 1980)

Poland:

1. The general consensus on the probable evolution of the Polish situation was that it would be a long and drawn out process. On balance, participants are inclined toward the judgement that a Soviet invasion in the near term is unlikely because all Polish actors have demonstrated an inclination to utilize self-restraint. The cohesion of the union leadership is an important factor in this regard: factionalization could result in the breakdown of discipline and control of workers. New demonstrations could follow. Assuming the regime and the unions are able to overcome the immediate issue of the registration of the national union, the next step is the implementation of the Gdansk agreements. [REDACTED] 25X1

2. The damage to the economy has been considerable, and Polish consumers may be in for a very hard winter. Consumer goods shortages will increase the chances for the domestic situation to deteriorate. The Soviet reaction for the last few weeks appears to have been restrained, although the harsh criticism of Czechoslovak, East German and Romanian leaders, in the first two cases probably acting as Soviet surrogates, maintains the pressure on the Polish leadership to restrain its concessions. Another key variable will be Kania's success in consolidating his own position, and in fending off hard-line criticism, within the Party. DIA interpreted Kania's policies thus far, for example with respect to the registration of the unions and their increased access to the national media, as already trying to reduce the concessions made in the 30 August Gdansk agreements. There was general agreement that over the longer term the regime's strategy, once the situation has been consolidated, will be to whittle away these concessions. [REDACTED] 25X1

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Soviet Policies Toward Iran-Iraq:

3. The Soviets still maintain a cautious and essentially neutral posture towards both countries. A key objective in Soviet policy will be to head off the re-establishment of any US military or political influence. Although the Soviets seek to maintain the impression that they are fulfilling their obligations to Iraq, they have apparently not engaged in direct resupply of major end items. The Soviets will seek to exploit the situation with respect to enhancing their influence in Iran, but thus far there is no clear Soviet tilt in evidence. They have apparently permitted Soviet equipment to be shipped to Iran by Libya or Syria through Soviet airspace, although we have no confirmation of this. It was noted that Iran will become progressively more politically vulnerable during the winter if the war continues and if shortages develop. [REDACTED] 25X1

4. Opportunities for the USSR to increase its influence in Tehran by offers of support would be increased. The lack of Soviet support for Iraq runs the risk of antagonizing the Hussein regime, but the Soviets probably feel that ultimate Iraqi dependence on the USSR for military resupply will prevent any serious deterioration in the Iraqi-Soviet relationship. [REDACTED] 25X1

5. Opinion was divided on the extent to which the Soviets are now consciously perpetuating the conditions for a break with Hussein and for an eventual tilt towards Iran. Opinion was also divided on the desirability from the Soviet point of view of the continuation of hostilities: some argued that the Soviets want the hostilities brought to an end as soon as possible because Moscow fears the reintroduction of US power in the region. Hence, the Soviets could be drawn to a mediation effort to avoid a military stalemate which they fear could bring the United States back if Iran asks for US aid. Other analysts interpreted Soviet options as increasing as both sides faced exhaustion, and the need for outside support became critical. One possible development might be an Iranian request to the Soviets to bring pressure to bear on Iraq, possibly via Syria, to stop or hinder the war effort and force the Iraqis to come to terms. A consensus emerged that the Soviets will undertake a major shift in policy in the next thirty days, assuming that the present pattern of the war continues. [REDACTED] 25X1

Soviet-Syrian Relations:

6. Through their October treaty with Damascus, the Soviets hope for a greater droit de regard in Syrian affairs, and for a greater role in any future Arab-Israeli negotiations. The treaty will initiate an expanded Soviet military supply policy, although Soviet deliveries will fall below earlier Syrian demands. It is unlikely that the treaty will have any near-term effect on Syrian military policies in the area, particularly with respect to Israel. [REDACTED] 25X1

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
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CSCE:

7. The intransigent Soviet position at the CSCE preparatory conference continues, despite the approaching 11 November starting date. The Soviet objective is to structure the timing and agenda of the actual conference in a way that severely limits debate of human rights issues and discussion of Soviet and East European policies of which the West is critical. Nevertheless, the Soviet interest in a follow-on conference on military detente continues to be an incentive for the Soviets to compromise with the West over the form of the 11 November Helsinki Review Conference. It is possible that no agreement will be reached by 11 November, but more likely that some compromise solution, such as postponing the agenda discussions for the opening of the formal conference, will be sought. [REDACTED]

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